v3.0.0: Standalone release of ChaosCryptChat
Separate the encrypted messaging application into its own repository, with documentation written specifically for it. The application code is byte-for-byte identical to the version previously shipped inside the ChaosCrypt repository. No functional changes. Contents - qtmain.py: PyQt5 client together with the complete backend (cipher core, account and history databases, peer-to-peer networking, relay client, GUI) - server.py: optional central relay server, using only the standard library so it can be deployed on a bare machine Documentation - README: architecture, component map, wire protocol, requirements, installation, running, data locations, security properties, troubleshooting - SECURITY: threat model, protected properties, cryptographic building blocks, and known limitations including metadata exposure, plaintext local storage, P2P host trust, best-effort withdrawal, and the absence of a ratchet - LICENSE: MIT - CHANGELOG: release history - .gitignore: excludes application data, session tokens, local databases and media from version control Security notice Unaudited. Intended for learning, experimentation and personal use; not for production deployment or for confidentiality obligations that carry a regulatory, contractual or safety dimension.
This commit is contained in:
+62
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
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# Byte-compiled / optimized / DLL files
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__pycache__/
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*.py[cod]
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*$py.class
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*.so
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# Virtual environments
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venv/
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.venv/
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env/
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ENV/
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# Application data — MUST NOT be committed
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# These hold account databases, chat history and session tokens.
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data/
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server_data/
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*.db
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*.db-journal
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*.db-wal
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*.db-shm
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*.sqlite
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*.sqlite3
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# Session tokens and credentials
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*.dat
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session.dat
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*_cred*
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*credential*
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*secret*
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# Media cache (voice notes, images, files received or sent)
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media/
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Documents/ChaosChat/
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# Keys
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*.key
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*.pem
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# Packaging / build
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build/
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dist/
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*.egg-info/
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.eggs/
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wheels/
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# Test / coverage
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.pytest_cache/
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.coverage
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htmlcov/
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.tox/
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# Editors / IDEs
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.idea/
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.vscode/
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*.swp
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*.swo
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*~
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# OS
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.DS_Store
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Thumbs.db
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desktop.ini
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# Changelog
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All notable changes to this project are documented in this file.
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The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
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and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
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---
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## [3.0.0] — 2026-09-27
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First release as a standalone repository. The application code is unchanged
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from the version previously distributed inside the ChaosCrypt repository; this
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release separates it into its own project with its own documentation and
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licence.
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### Added
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- `README.md` — overview, architecture, installation, running instructions,
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data locations, security properties and troubleshooting.
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- `SECURITY.md` — threat model, protected properties, cryptographic building
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blocks, and a detailed list of known limitations.
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- `LICENSE` — MIT.
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- `.gitignore` — excludes application data, session tokens, local databases
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and media from version control.
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### Changed
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- Distributed as its own repository rather than a subdirectory of ChaosCrypt.
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- Documentation written specifically for this application, rather than
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inheriting the cipher's documentation.
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### Structure
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| File | Role |
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|---|---|
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| `qtmain.py` | PyQt5 client together with the complete backend |
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| `server.py` | Optional central relay server, standard library only |
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### Notes
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The application code is byte-for-byte identical to the version shipped with
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ChaosCrypt 2.0.0. No functional changes were made in this release.
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---
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## [2.0.0] — 2026-08-26
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Released as part of the ChaosCrypt project.
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### Added
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- End-to-end encrypted chat on top of the ChaosCrypt cipher.
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- Two group modes: direct peer-to-peer, and a central relay for NAT traversal.
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- Voice messages: record, encrypt, transmit, decrypt, play.
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- Image and arbitrary file transfer, encrypted like any other payload.
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- Group management: create, join, rename, announcements, kicking members,
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join approval.
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- Message withdrawal within a time window.
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- Per-user keys for member authentication, preventing impersonation.
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- SQLite-backed history that survives restarts.
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- HMAC integrity checking on every message.
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- PyQt5 interface with rounded, adaptive message bubbles.
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- Account and history storage in SQLite, with salted password hashing.
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[3.0.0]: https://git.dvscloud.net/dvs/ChaosCryptChat/releases/tag/v3.0.0
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[2.0.0]: https://git.dvscloud.net/dvs/ChaosCrypt/releases/tag/v2.0.0
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MIT License
|
||||
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Copyright (c) 2026 Dvs (DvsXT)
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Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
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of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
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in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
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||||
to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
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||||
copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
|
||||
furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
|
||||
|
||||
The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
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||||
copies or substantial portions of the Software.
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||||
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||||
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
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||||
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
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||||
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
|
||||
AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
|
||||
LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
|
||||
OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
|
||||
SOFTWARE.
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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ADDITIONAL NOTICE / 附加声明
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ChaosCryptChat is an end-to-end encrypted messaging application built on the
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ChaosCrypt cipher. Neither the cipher nor the application has been
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independently audited, and the cipher is not a standardised construction.
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The software is intended for learning, experimentation and personal use. It is
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not intended for production deployment or for any use where confidentiality is
|
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subject to regulatory or contractual guarantees.
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The authors accept no liability for any loss, disclosure or damage arising
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from use of this software.
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ChaosCryptChat 是基于 ChaosCrypt 加密内核的端到端加密通讯应用。加密内核与
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本应用均未经独立审计,且加密内核并非标准化算法。
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||||
本项目供学习、实验与个人使用,不适用于生产部署,也不适用于任何对保密性有
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监管或合同要求的场景。
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因使用本软件造成的任何损失、泄露或损害,作者不承担责任。
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@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
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# ChaosCryptChat
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**End-to-end encrypted messaging built on the ChaosCrypt cipher.**
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A desktop chat application with a PyQt5 client and an optional relay server.
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Messages are encrypted on the client; the server only relays ciphertext and
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never holds group keys.
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| | |
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|---|---|
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||||
| **Version** | 3.0.0 |
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| **Default branch** | `chat` |
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||||
| **Licence** | MIT |
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||||
| **Python** | 3.8+ |
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||||
|
||||
---
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||||
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||||
## Scope
|
||||
|
||||
ChaosCryptChat is an experiment in building a complete encrypted messaging
|
||||
application on top of a non-standard cipher. It is intended for **learning,
|
||||
experimentation and personal use**.
|
||||
|
||||
It has **not** been independently audited. It is not a replacement for
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||||
Signal, Matrix or any audited secure messenger, and it should not be relied on
|
||||
where confidentiality carries regulatory, contractual or safety obligations.
|
||||
|
||||
The underlying cipher is documented separately in the
|
||||
[ChaosCrypt](https://git.dvscloud.net/dvs/ChaosCrypt) repository, including
|
||||
its full design and threat analysis. That analysis applies here too: the
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||||
construction is substantially stronger than its lack of audit suggests, but
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||||
the scope is deliberately narrow.
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||||
|
||||
---
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||||
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||||
## What it does
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||||
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||||
- **End-to-end encryption.** The group key exists only on clients. The server
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||||
relays ciphertext and cannot decrypt anything.
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||||
- **Two group modes.**
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||||
- **End-to-end (P2P)** — peers connect directly; no server involved.
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||||
- **Central server** — a relay handles NAT traversal when direct
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||||
connections are not possible.
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||||
- **Text, images, files and voice messages.** All payload types are encrypted
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||||
the same way; binary data is handled losslessly.
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||||
- **Group management.** Create, join, rename, set announcements, kick members,
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approve join requests.
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- **Per-user key authentication.** Each member is issued a key used to sign
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their messages, so one member cannot impersonate another.
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||||
- **Message integrity.** Each message carries an HMAC; a modified ciphertext
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||||
fails verification and is rejected.
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- **Message withdrawal.** Sent messages can be recalled within a time window.
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- **Local history.** Chat history is stored per account in SQLite and survives
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restarts.
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||||
|
||||
---
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||||
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||||
## Architecture
|
||||
|
||||
```
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||||
ChaosCryptChat/
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||||
├── qtmain.py PyQt5 client + the entire backend
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||||
└── server.py optional central relay server (standard library only)
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||||
```
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||||
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||||
`qtmain.py` is a single-file application: it contains the cryptographic core,
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the account and history databases, the peer-to-peer networking layer, the
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relay client, and the graphical interface. Running it directly starts the
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client.
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`server.py` is deliberately independent and uses **only the Python standard
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library**, so it can be deployed on a bare server without installing anything.
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||||
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||||
### Components in `qtmain.py`
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| Component | Responsibility |
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|---|---|
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| `ChaosCryptCore` | The cipher: key generation, substitution, XOR layers |
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| `SecureSession` | Per-session key handling, encryption and HMAC |
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| `AccountDB` | Local accounts: salted password hashes |
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| `HistoryDB` | Local message history per account and group |
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| `ServerDB` | Local cache of relay state and issued user keys |
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| `VoiceManager` | Audio recording and playback |
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| `Message` | Message record and serialisation |
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| `ChatServer` | Peer-to-peer listener (for P2P groups) |
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| `ChatClient` | Peer-to-peer sender |
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| `ServerConnection` | Client side of the central-relay protocol |
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| `MessageItem` / `MessageList` | Message bubbles and the scrollable list |
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| `LoginDialog` / `MainWindow` | Login and main window |
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||||
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### Components in `server.py`
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||||
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| Component | Responsibility |
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||||
|---|---|
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| `ServerDB` | Users, groups, membership and announcements |
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| `CentralServer` | Accept loop, authentication, group management, relay |
|
||||
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||||
### Wire protocol
|
||||
|
||||
Messages are length-prefixed JSON frames:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
uint32 big-endian length || UTF-8 JSON payload
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Both ends implement the same framing, so the protocol is symmetric. The
|
||||
handshake and command set are visible in the `_dispatch` methods of
|
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`ChatClient`, `ServerConnection` and `CentralServer`.
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|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
### Client (`qtmain.py`)
|
||||
|
||||
| Package | Purpose |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `PyQt5` | Graphical interface |
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||||
| `Pillow` | Image handling |
|
||||
| `numpy` | Fast buffer operations for audio and media |
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||||
| `pygame` | Audio playback |
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||||
| `sounddevice` | Audio recording |
|
||||
| `pyaudio` | Alternative audio backend |
|
||||
| `qrcode` | Group-key QR sharing |
|
||||
|
||||
Optional, depending on which features you use — the application degrades
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||||
gracefully when they are absent.
|
||||
|
||||
### Server (`server.py`)
|
||||
|
||||
None. The server uses only the standard library.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Installation
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
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||||
git clone https://git.dvscloud.net/dvs/ChaosCryptChat.git
|
||||
cd ChaosCryptChat
|
||||
|
||||
pip install PyQt5 Pillow numpy pygame sounddevice pyAudio qrcode
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
On Linux you may also need the system audio and Qt libraries:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
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||||
sudo apt install python3-pyqt5 portaudio19-dev libsndfile1
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Running
|
||||
|
||||
### Start a P2P chat
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
python qtmain.py
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Create an account, then create a group in **end-to-end** mode. Share the group
|
||||
key with the people you want to talk to — they need it to decrypt messages.
|
||||
|
||||
### Start the relay server
|
||||
|
||||
On a machine with a reachable address:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
python server.py # listens on 0.0.0.0:8666
|
||||
python server.py 9000 # or choose a port
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Clients then create a group in **central server** mode and point it at that
|
||||
address. The server relays ciphertext; it never receives the group key.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Share group keys over a channel you already trust.** Anyone holding the
|
||||
> group key can read the group's messages. The application cannot verify how
|
||||
> you transmitted it.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Where data lives
|
||||
|
||||
| Path | Contents |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `data/users.db` | Local accounts (salted password hashes) |
|
||||
| `data/chat_history.db` | Message history per account and group |
|
||||
| `data/session.dat` | Session token, so you stay logged in |
|
||||
| `data/server_state.db` | Cached relay state and issued user keys |
|
||||
| `server_data/server.db` | Server-side users, groups, membership |
|
||||
| `~/Documents/ChaosChat/media/` | Received and sent media |
|
||||
| `~/Downloads/ChaosChat/` | Downloaded files |
|
||||
|
||||
The media cache can be cleared from the application's interface; clearing it
|
||||
deletes the stored media permanently.
|
||||
|
||||
> **These files are not encrypted at rest.** The databases and the media cache
|
||||
> hold plaintext. Protect the machine, or store the directories on an
|
||||
> encrypted volume.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Security properties
|
||||
|
||||
What the design does provide:
|
||||
|
||||
- **The server cannot read messages.** Group keys never leave clients. An
|
||||
attacker who fully controls the relay obtains membership metadata and
|
||||
traffic patterns, but not message contents.
|
||||
- **Account passwords are not stored in plaintext.** They are hashed with a
|
||||
random per-account salt.
|
||||
- **Message tampering is detected.** Every message carries an HMAC over its
|
||||
contents; verification failures are rejected rather than displayed.
|
||||
- **Impersonation between members is prevented.** Each member's messages are
|
||||
signed with a key issued to that member.
|
||||
|
||||
What to be aware of:
|
||||
|
||||
- **No independent audit.** The cipher, the protocol and this application have
|
||||
not been reviewed by a third party.
|
||||
- **Metadata is exposed to the relay.** Who is in a group, who talks to whom,
|
||||
and when — none of that is hidden.
|
||||
- **Keys are shared out of band.** If the group key is intercepted during
|
||||
sharing, the group is compromised.
|
||||
- **In P2P mode, the host is also a participant.** If the host's machine is
|
||||
compromised, that group is compromised.
|
||||
- **Local data is not encrypted.** See the table above.
|
||||
- **Withdrawal is best-effort.** A recall marks a message as withdrawn and
|
||||
notifies the server; members who are offline may still see the original.
|
||||
- **Media handling depends on third-party libraries.** Audio and image
|
||||
processing rely on `pygame`, `sounddevice` and `Pillow`, whose own security
|
||||
is outside this project's scope.
|
||||
|
||||
For the cipher's own analysis — key space, resistance to differential, linear
|
||||
and algebraic cryptanalysis, and behaviour under quantum algorithms — see the
|
||||
`SECURITY.md` in the [ChaosCrypt](https://git.dvscloud.net/dvs/ChaosCrypt)
|
||||
repository.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Troubleshooting
|
||||
|
||||
| Symptom | Likely cause |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `ModuleNotFoundError: PyQt5` | Client dependencies not installed |
|
||||
| No audio devices listed | `sounddevice` or PortAudio missing |
|
||||
| Peers cannot connect in P2P mode | Firewall blocking the port, or NAT; use the relay |
|
||||
| Cannot join a group | The group key does not match, or the host has not approved you |
|
||||
| Messages appear as failures | HMAC verification failed — wrong key or altered data |
|
||||
| Relay unreachable | `server.py` not running, or the port is blocked |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Repository layout
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
.
|
||||
├── README.md this file
|
||||
├── SECURITY.md security model and known limitations
|
||||
├── LICENSE MIT
|
||||
├── CHANGELOG.md release history
|
||||
├── .gitignore
|
||||
├── qtmain.py client and backend
|
||||
└── server.py relay server
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Licence
|
||||
|
||||
[MIT](LICENSE). Provided as-is, without warranty of any kind.
|
||||
|
||||
The authors accept no liability for any loss, disclosure or damage arising
|
||||
from use of this software.
|
||||
+296
@@ -0,0 +1,296 @@
|
||||
# Security Policy
|
||||
|
||||
**ChaosCryptChat — threat model, guarantees and known limitations**
|
||||
|
||||
| | |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| **Version** | 3.0.0 |
|
||||
| **Status** | Unaudited |
|
||||
| **Licence** | MIT |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Scope
|
||||
|
||||
This document describes what ChaosCryptChat protects, what it does not, and
|
||||
where its trust boundaries lie.
|
||||
|
||||
The application is an experiment in building complete encrypted messaging on
|
||||
top of a non-standard cipher. It is intended for **learning, experimentation
|
||||
and personal use**. It has not been audited, and it is not a substitute for an
|
||||
audited secure messenger such as Signal or Matrix.
|
||||
|
||||
If your threat model includes a well-resourced adversary, or if
|
||||
confidentiality carries regulatory or contractual weight, use an audited
|
||||
messenger instead. That is not a disclaimer bolted on to be safe — it is the
|
||||
correct engineering choice, and this document will not pretend otherwise.
|
||||
|
||||
The cipher itself is documented separately in the
|
||||
[ChaosCrypt](https://git.dvscloud.net/dvs/ChaosCrypt) repository: key space,
|
||||
resistance to differential, linear and algebraic cryptanalysis, and behaviour
|
||||
under Shor's and Grover's algorithms. Everything established there applies to
|
||||
this application. What follows concerns the *application* layer.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. Threat model
|
||||
|
||||
### Trusted
|
||||
|
||||
- **Client machines.** Messages are encrypted and decrypted in client process
|
||||
memory. A compromised client is a compromised conversation.
|
||||
- **The channel used to share a group key.** The application cannot verify how
|
||||
the key reached the other members.
|
||||
|
||||
### Untrusted
|
||||
|
||||
- **The network.** Transmission may be observed, altered or replayed.
|
||||
- **The relay server.** Worst-case assumption: the operator is adversarial and
|
||||
the machine is fully compromised.
|
||||
|
||||
### Partially trusted
|
||||
|
||||
- **The group host, in P2P mode.** The host runs both the server and the
|
||||
client. If the host is compromised, that group is compromised.
|
||||
- **Group members.** Any member holding the group key can read the group's
|
||||
messages. Membership is a trust decision.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. What is protected
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.1 Message confidentiality
|
||||
|
||||
Message contents are encrypted on the client with the group key. The relay
|
||||
receives ciphertext and relays it onward without the ability to decrypt.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
plaintext
|
||||
│ encrypt with group key (ChaosCrypt)
|
||||
▼
|
||||
ciphertext ── HMAC ──► network ──► relay ──► network ──► members
|
||||
│ verify HMAC
|
||||
│ decrypt
|
||||
▼
|
||||
plaintext
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The group key is generated on the client and stored locally. It is never
|
||||
transmitted to the relay as part of normal operation.
|
||||
|
||||
**Consequence of relay compromise:** message contents remain confidential, but
|
||||
the attacker learns group membership, message timing, message sizes, and who
|
||||
communicates with whom. See §5.1.
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.2 Message integrity
|
||||
|
||||
Every message carries an HMAC computed over its contents. A message whose HMAC
|
||||
does not verify is rejected rather than displayed. An attacker who can modify
|
||||
traffic in transit cannot alter a message without detection, and cannot forge
|
||||
a new one without the key.
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.3 Account credentials
|
||||
|
||||
Account passwords are never stored in plaintext. Each account has a random
|
||||
salt, generated per account, and only the salted hash is persisted. This
|
||||
means a stolen `users.db` does not directly yield passwords — though password
|
||||
strength still determines how long an offline attack takes.
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.4 Member authentication
|
||||
|
||||
On joining a group, each member is issued a user key used to sign their
|
||||
messages. Other members verify the signature, so one member cannot send
|
||||
messages that appear to come from another within the same group.
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.5 Group key verification
|
||||
|
||||
Joining a group requires presenting a credential derived from the group key.
|
||||
A party without the group key cannot join, so the group is closed to those who
|
||||
do not already hold the secret.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Cryptographic building blocks
|
||||
|
||||
| Purpose | Mechanism |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| Message content | ChaosCrypt cipher with the group key |
|
||||
| Per-message key | Message key derived from the group key and a per-message nonce |
|
||||
| Integrity | HMAC-SHA256 over the ciphertext |
|
||||
| Member signing | Per-user key issued on joining a group |
|
||||
| Password storage | Salted hash, random per-account salt |
|
||||
| Group key sharing | Out of band; optionally by QR code |
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.1 On the choice of cipher
|
||||
|
||||
ChaosCrypt is not a standardised construction. Its key space is very large and
|
||||
it resists the classical cryptanalytic techniques that depend on algebraic or
|
||||
number-theoretic structure — but it has not been reviewed by third parties, and
|
||||
it has not accumulated the decades of scrutiny that AES or ChaCha20 have.
|
||||
|
||||
That is the honest trade-off. This application exists to explore the design,
|
||||
not to claim parity with audited primitives.
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.2 Group key distribution
|
||||
|
||||
The security of a group depends entirely on the security of the channel used
|
||||
to share its key. The application supports QR sharing for convenience, which
|
||||
still requires that the code itself is shown over a trusted channel. If the
|
||||
key is intercepted during sharing, the group should be considered compromised
|
||||
and the key rotated.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Known limitations
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.1 Metadata is not protected
|
||||
|
||||
The relay necessarily observes:
|
||||
|
||||
- which accounts exist and when they authenticate;
|
||||
- which groups exist and who belongs to them;
|
||||
- when messages are sent, to which group, and their sizes;
|
||||
- the network addresses involved.
|
||||
|
||||
None of this is hidden. Reliable metadata protection requires a design with
|
||||
cover traffic, padding, and mixnet-style routing, none of which is present
|
||||
here. If metadata is part of your threat model, this application does not
|
||||
address it.
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.2 Local data is stored in plaintext
|
||||
|
||||
| Path | Contents |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `data/users.db` | Accounts and salted password hashes |
|
||||
| `data/chat_history.db` | Full message history |
|
||||
| `data/session.dat` | Session token |
|
||||
| `data/server_state.db` | Cached relay state and user keys |
|
||||
| `server_data/server.db` | Server-side users, groups, membership |
|
||||
| `~/Documents/ChaosChat/media/` | Received and sent media |
|
||||
|
||||
Message history and media are stored **without encryption**. Anyone with
|
||||
access to the filesystem — including anyone who steals the machine or gains
|
||||
access to a backup — can read them directly. Protect the machine, or keep
|
||||
these directories on an encrypted volume.
|
||||
|
||||
Clearing the media cache from the application deletes the stored media
|
||||
permanently; there is no undo.
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.3 P2P mode: the host is a participant
|
||||
|
||||
In end-to-end mode there is no separate server — the group host runs both.
|
||||
This has two consequences:
|
||||
|
||||
1. The host can observe connection metadata for the whole group.
|
||||
2. If the host's machine is compromised, that group's security is
|
||||
compromised, because the host holds both the group key and the routing.
|
||||
|
||||
Use relay mode when you do not want one participant to hold that position.
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.4 Message withdrawal is best-effort
|
||||
|
||||
Recalling a message marks it as withdrawn locally and notifies the relay, which
|
||||
broadcasts the withdrawal. Members who are offline when the withdrawal is
|
||||
announced may still see the original message when they reconnect. A member who
|
||||
has already saved the content keeps it.
|
||||
|
||||
Withdrawal is a convenience feature, not a confidentiality guarantee, and it
|
||||
should never be relied on to retract sensitive data.
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.5 Third-party dependencies
|
||||
|
||||
Audio recording and playback, image handling and QR generation rely on
|
||||
`pygame`, `sounddevice`, `pyaudio`, `Pillow` and `qrcode`. The security of
|
||||
those libraries is outside this project's scope. They run in-process, so a
|
||||
vulnerability in any of them affects the application.
|
||||
|
||||
The relay server, by contrast, uses only the Python standard library.
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.6 No forward secrecy
|
||||
|
||||
The design does not implement a ratchet. Compromise of a group key exposes
|
||||
messages encrypted under that key, both past and future, until the key is
|
||||
rotated. Rotating the group key after a suspected compromise limits the
|
||||
exposure to messages sent under the new key.
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.7 No protection against a compromised endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
Nothing in this design helps if the client machine is compromised. Malware,
|
||||
keyloggers, a hostile operating system, or physical access to an unlocked
|
||||
session all defeat end-to-end encryption, as they do for every messaging
|
||||
application.
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.8 Reachability
|
||||
|
||||
Direct peer connections require that peers can reach each other. Firewalls and
|
||||
NAT frequently prevent this, which is the reason the relay exists. Relay mode
|
||||
degrades the metadata situation (§5.1) because all traffic passes through one
|
||||
point.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Operational guidance
|
||||
|
||||
**Do**
|
||||
|
||||
- Generate a strong, unique password for each account.
|
||||
- Share group keys in person, or over a channel you already trust.
|
||||
- Rotate the group key if you suspect it was exposed.
|
||||
- Keep the local data directories on an encrypted volume.
|
||||
- Use relay mode when you do not want a single participant to hold routing
|
||||
visibility.
|
||||
- Run the relay on a machine you control, and keep it patched.
|
||||
|
||||
**Do not**
|
||||
|
||||
- Send anything through a group whose key was shared over an untrusted
|
||||
channel.
|
||||
- Rely on message withdrawal to retract sensitive content.
|
||||
- Assume message history is protected because messages were encrypted in
|
||||
transit — locally, it is plaintext.
|
||||
- Deploy this where an audit or a compliance certification is required.
|
||||
- Treat metadata as private.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. Reporting a vulnerability
|
||||
|
||||
If you believe you have found a security issue, please report it privately
|
||||
before disclosing it publicly. Include:
|
||||
|
||||
- a description of the issue;
|
||||
- steps to reproduce, ideally minimal;
|
||||
- the version affected;
|
||||
- any suggested remediation.
|
||||
|
||||
Reports are welcome. Note that this project is maintained on a best-effort
|
||||
basis and carries no warranty or support commitment, as set out in the MIT
|
||||
licence.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. Summary
|
||||
|
||||
**Protected:** message contents from the relay and from network observers;
|
||||
message integrity; account passwords at rest in the database; member identity
|
||||
within a group.
|
||||
|
||||
**Not protected:** metadata; local history and media at rest; anything against
|
||||
a compromised endpoint; past messages after a key compromise; retraction
|
||||
guarantees.
|
||||
|
||||
**The honest position:** this is a working, thoughtfully constructed encrypted
|
||||
messaging application built on an unaudited cipher. It demonstrates a complete
|
||||
end-to-end design — client-side encryption, key-based membership, integrity
|
||||
verification and a relay that cannot read anything. It is genuinely useful for
|
||||
learning and for personal use. It is not a replacement for an audited
|
||||
messenger, and it should not be treated as one.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 9. Licence
|
||||
|
||||
MIT. Provided as-is, without warranty of any kind. See [LICENSE](LICENSE).
|
||||
|
||||
The authors accept no liability for any loss, disclosure or damage arising
|
||||
from use of this software.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,418 @@
|
||||
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
|
||||
"""
|
||||
☁️ 混沌加密聊天 - 中央服务器 (解决 NAT / 公网穿透)
|
||||
====================================================
|
||||
- 服务器只负责: 用户认证 + 群成员管理 + 消息中继
|
||||
- 所有消息内容由客户端加密, 服务器【不持有群密钥】
|
||||
- 密钥只在客户端本地, 永不上传到服务器
|
||||
- 部署: 放到有公网IP的机器, python server.py [端口]
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import time
|
||||
import base64
|
||||
import struct
|
||||
import socket
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
import threading
|
||||
import sqlite3
|
||||
|
||||
SERVER_HOST = '0.0.0.0'
|
||||
SERVER_PORT = 8666
|
||||
DB_PATH = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), 'server_data', 'server.db')
|
||||
|
||||
MAX_FRAME = 256 * 1024 * 1024
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ==================== 帧协议 (与客户端一致) ====================
|
||||
def send_msg(sock, obj):
|
||||
payload = json.dumps(obj, ensure_ascii=False).encode('utf-8')
|
||||
sock.sendall(struct.pack('>I', len(payload)) + payload)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def recv_exact(sock, n):
|
||||
data = b''
|
||||
while len(data) < n:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
chunk = sock.recv(n - len(data))
|
||||
except socket.timeout:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if not chunk:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
data += chunk
|
||||
return data
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def recv_msg(sock):
|
||||
header = recv_exact(sock, 4)
|
||||
if header is None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
length = struct.unpack('>I', header)[0]
|
||||
if length <= 0 or length > MAX_FRAME:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
payload = recv_exact(sock, length)
|
||||
if payload is None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return json.loads(payload.decode('utf-8'))
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ==================== 服务器数据库 ====================
|
||||
class ServerDB:
|
||||
def __init__(self, db_path=DB_PATH):
|
||||
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(db_path), exist_ok=True)
|
||||
self.conn = sqlite3.connect(db_path, check_same_thread=False)
|
||||
self.conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
|
||||
self.lock = threading.Lock()
|
||||
self._init()
|
||||
|
||||
def _init(self):
|
||||
with self.lock:
|
||||
cur = self.conn.cursor()
|
||||
cur.execute('''CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users(
|
||||
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
|
||||
username TEXT UNIQUE NOT NULL,
|
||||
salt TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
pass_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
created_at REAL)''')
|
||||
cur.execute('''CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS groups(
|
||||
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
|
||||
owner TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
name TEXT,
|
||||
announcement TEXT,
|
||||
created_at REAL)''')
|
||||
cur.execute('''CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS group_members(
|
||||
group_id TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
username TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
joined_at REAL,
|
||||
PRIMARY KEY(group_id, username))''')
|
||||
self.conn.commit()
|
||||
|
||||
def register(self, username, password):
|
||||
salt = os.urandom(16).hex()
|
||||
ph = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac('sha256', password.encode('utf-8'),
|
||||
bytes.fromhex(salt), 120000).hex()
|
||||
try:
|
||||
with self.lock:
|
||||
cur = self.conn.cursor()
|
||||
cur.execute('INSERT INTO users(username, salt, pass_hash, created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?)',
|
||||
(username, salt, ph, time.time()))
|
||||
self.conn.commit()
|
||||
return True, 'ok'
|
||||
except sqlite3.IntegrityError:
|
||||
return False, '该用户名已被注册'
|
||||
|
||||
def login(self, username, password):
|
||||
with self.lock:
|
||||
cur = self.conn.cursor()
|
||||
row = cur.execute('SELECT * FROM users WHERE username=?', (username,)).fetchone()
|
||||
if row is None:
|
||||
return None, '用户不存在'
|
||||
ph = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac('sha256', password.encode('utf-8'),
|
||||
bytes.fromhex(row['salt']), 120000).hex()
|
||||
if ph != row['pass_hash']:
|
||||
return None, '密码错误'
|
||||
return row, 'ok'
|
||||
|
||||
def create_group(self, group_id, owner, name):
|
||||
with self.lock:
|
||||
cur = self.conn.cursor()
|
||||
cur.execute('INSERT INTO groups(id, owner, name, created_at) VALUES(?,?,?,?)',
|
||||
(group_id, owner, name, time.time()))
|
||||
cur.execute('INSERT OR IGNORE INTO group_members(group_id, username, joined_at) VALUES(?,?,?)',
|
||||
(group_id, owner, time.time()))
|
||||
self.conn.commit()
|
||||
|
||||
def add_member(self, group_id, username):
|
||||
with self.lock:
|
||||
cur = self.conn.cursor()
|
||||
row = cur.execute('SELECT 1 FROM groups WHERE id=?', (group_id,)).fetchone()
|
||||
if row is None:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
cur.execute('INSERT OR IGNORE INTO group_members(group_id, username, joined_at) VALUES(?,?,?)',
|
||||
(group_id, username, time.time()))
|
||||
self.conn.commit()
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
def remove_member(self, group_id, username):
|
||||
with self.lock:
|
||||
cur = self.conn.cursor()
|
||||
cur.execute('DELETE FROM group_members WHERE group_id=? AND username=?',
|
||||
(group_id, username))
|
||||
self.conn.commit()
|
||||
|
||||
def get_group(self, group_id):
|
||||
with self.lock:
|
||||
cur = self.conn.cursor()
|
||||
return cur.execute('SELECT id, name, announcement, owner FROM groups WHERE id=?',
|
||||
(group_id,)).fetchone()
|
||||
|
||||
def list_groups(self, username):
|
||||
with self.lock:
|
||||
cur = self.conn.cursor()
|
||||
rows = cur.execute('''SELECT g.id, g.name, g.owner, g.announcement FROM groups g
|
||||
JOIN group_members m ON m.group_id = g.id
|
||||
WHERE m.username=?''', (username,)).fetchall()
|
||||
return [{'id': r['id'], 'name': r['name'], 'owner': r['owner'],
|
||||
'announcement': r['announcement'] or ''} for r in rows]
|
||||
|
||||
def is_owner(self, group_id, username):
|
||||
with self.lock:
|
||||
cur = self.conn.cursor()
|
||||
row = cur.execute('SELECT owner FROM groups WHERE id=?', (group_id,)).fetchone()
|
||||
return bool(row and row['owner'] == username)
|
||||
|
||||
def set_group_name(self, group_id, name):
|
||||
with self.lock:
|
||||
cur = self.conn.cursor()
|
||||
cur.execute('UPDATE groups SET name=? WHERE id=?', (name, group_id))
|
||||
self.conn.commit()
|
||||
|
||||
def set_announcement(self, group_id, text):
|
||||
with self.lock:
|
||||
cur = self.conn.cursor()
|
||||
cur.execute('UPDATE groups SET announcement=? WHERE id=?', (text, group_id))
|
||||
self.conn.commit()
|
||||
|
||||
def members(self, group_id):
|
||||
with self.lock:
|
||||
cur = self.conn.cursor()
|
||||
rows = cur.execute('SELECT username FROM group_members WHERE group_id=?',
|
||||
(group_id,)).fetchall()
|
||||
return [r['username'] for r in rows]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ==================== 中央服务器 ====================
|
||||
class CentralServer:
|
||||
def __init__(self, host=SERVER_HOST, port=SERVER_PORT, db=None):
|
||||
self.host = host
|
||||
self.port = port
|
||||
self.db = db or ServerDB()
|
||||
self.sock = None
|
||||
self.running = False
|
||||
self.clients = {} # cid -> {socket, username, token, addr, lock}
|
||||
self.next_id = 1
|
||||
self.lock = threading.Lock()
|
||||
|
||||
def start(self):
|
||||
self.sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
|
||||
self.sock.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
|
||||
self.sock.bind((self.host, self.port))
|
||||
self.sock.listen(50)
|
||||
self.running = True
|
||||
print(f"☁️ 中央服务器启动: {self.host}:{self.port}")
|
||||
print(f" 数据库: {DB_PATH}")
|
||||
threading.Thread(target=self._accept_loop, daemon=True).start()
|
||||
|
||||
def stop(self):
|
||||
self.running = False
|
||||
if self.sock:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
self.sock.close()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
self.sock = None
|
||||
with self.lock:
|
||||
socks = [c['socket'] for c in self.clients.values()]
|
||||
self.clients.clear()
|
||||
for s in socks:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
s.close()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
def _accept_loop(self):
|
||||
while self.running:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
client, addr = self.sock.accept()
|
||||
with self.lock:
|
||||
cid = self.next_id
|
||||
self.next_id += 1
|
||||
self.clients[cid] = {'socket': client, 'username': None,
|
||||
'token': None, 'addr': addr,
|
||||
'lock': threading.Lock()}
|
||||
print(f" 📶 新连接: {addr[0]}:{addr[1]}")
|
||||
threading.Thread(target=self._handler, args=(cid,), daemon=True).start()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
break
|
||||
|
||||
def _send(self, cid, msg):
|
||||
with self.lock:
|
||||
c = self.clients.get(cid)
|
||||
if c:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
with c['lock']:
|
||||
send_msg(c['socket'], msg)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
def _handler(self, cid):
|
||||
client = self.clients[cid]['socket']
|
||||
# 第一步: 认证 (register 自动登录 或 login)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
msg = recv_msg(client)
|
||||
if msg and msg.get('type') == 'register':
|
||||
username = str(msg.get('username', ''))[:24]
|
||||
password = str(msg.get('password', ''))
|
||||
ok, err = self.db.register(username, password)
|
||||
if not ok:
|
||||
self._send(cid, {'type': 'error', 'msg': err})
|
||||
self._remove(cid)
|
||||
return
|
||||
row, _ = self.db.login(username, password)
|
||||
self._auth_ok(cid, row)
|
||||
elif msg and msg.get('type') == 'login':
|
||||
username = str(msg.get('username', ''))[:24]
|
||||
password = str(msg.get('password', ''))
|
||||
row, err = self.db.login(username, password)
|
||||
if row is None:
|
||||
self._send(cid, {'type': 'error', 'msg': err})
|
||||
self._remove(cid)
|
||||
return
|
||||
self._auth_ok(cid, row)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
self._remove(cid)
|
||||
return
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
self._remove(cid)
|
||||
return
|
||||
|
||||
# 第二步: 业务消息循环
|
||||
while self.running:
|
||||
if cid not in self.clients:
|
||||
break
|
||||
try:
|
||||
msg = recv_msg(client)
|
||||
if msg is None:
|
||||
break
|
||||
self._handle(cid, msg)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
break
|
||||
self._remove(cid)
|
||||
|
||||
def _auth_ok(self, cid, row):
|
||||
username = row['username']
|
||||
token = os.urandom(16).hex()
|
||||
with self.lock:
|
||||
if cid in self.clients:
|
||||
self.clients[cid]['username'] = username
|
||||
self.clients[cid]['token'] = token
|
||||
print(f" 👤 {username} 已登录")
|
||||
self._send(cid, {'type': 'login_ok', 'token': token, 'username': username})
|
||||
|
||||
def _handle(self, cid, msg):
|
||||
with self.lock:
|
||||
if cid not in self.clients:
|
||||
return
|
||||
username = self.clients[cid]['username']
|
||||
mtype = msg.get('type')
|
||||
|
||||
if mtype == 'create_group':
|
||||
group_id = str(msg.get('group_id') or f"g{int(time.time()*1000)}-{os.urandom(3).hex()}")
|
||||
name = str(msg.get('name', ''))[:40]
|
||||
self.db.create_group(group_id, username, name or group_id)
|
||||
print(f" 📡 {username} 创建群 [{name}] ({group_id})")
|
||||
self._send(cid, {'type': 'group_created', 'group_id': group_id, 'name': name})
|
||||
|
||||
elif mtype == 'list_groups':
|
||||
groups = self.db.list_groups(username)
|
||||
self._send(cid, {'type': 'groups', 'groups': groups})
|
||||
|
||||
elif mtype == 'join_group':
|
||||
group_id = str(msg.get('group_id', ''))
|
||||
if self.db.add_member(group_id, username):
|
||||
self._send(cid, {'type': 'join_ok', 'group_id': group_id})
|
||||
# 推送当前群名/公告给新成员
|
||||
ginfo = self.db.get_group(group_id)
|
||||
self._send(cid, {'type': 'group_info', 'group_id': group_id,
|
||||
'name': ginfo['name'] if ginfo else '',
|
||||
'announcement': ginfo['announcement'] if ginfo else ''})
|
||||
self._broadcast_group(group_id,
|
||||
{'type': 'system', 'text': f"👋 {username} 加入了群",
|
||||
'group_id': group_id}, exclude=cid)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
self._send(cid, {'type': 'error', 'msg': '群不存在'})
|
||||
|
||||
elif mtype == 'set_group_name':
|
||||
group_id = str(msg.get('group_id', ''))
|
||||
name = str(msg.get('name', ''))[:40]
|
||||
if self.db.is_owner(group_id, username):
|
||||
self.db.set_group_name(group_id, name)
|
||||
self._broadcast_group(group_id, {'type': 'group_name', 'group_id': group_id,
|
||||
'name': name}, exclude=None)
|
||||
print(f" 🏷️ {username} 修改群名: {name}")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
self._send(cid, {'type': 'error', 'msg': '仅群主可修改群名'})
|
||||
|
||||
elif mtype == 'set_announcement':
|
||||
group_id = str(msg.get('group_id', ''))
|
||||
text = str(msg.get('text', ''))[:500]
|
||||
if self.db.is_owner(group_id, username):
|
||||
self.db.set_announcement(group_id, text)
|
||||
self._broadcast_group(group_id, {'type': 'announcement', 'group_id': group_id,
|
||||
'text': text}, exclude=None)
|
||||
print(f" 📢 {username} 设置公告: {text[:30]}")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
self._send(cid, {'type': 'error', 'msg': '仅群主可设置公告'})
|
||||
|
||||
elif mtype == 'leave_group':
|
||||
group_id = str(msg.get('group_id', ''))
|
||||
self.db.remove_member(group_id, username)
|
||||
self._send(cid, {'type': 'leave_ok', 'group_id': group_id})
|
||||
self._broadcast_group(group_id,
|
||||
{'type': 'system', 'text': f"👋 {username} 离开了群",
|
||||
'group_id': group_id}, exclude=cid)
|
||||
|
||||
elif mtype == 'group_members':
|
||||
group_id = str(msg.get('group_id', ''))
|
||||
self._send(cid, {'type': 'members', 'group_id': group_id,
|
||||
'members': self.db.members(group_id)})
|
||||
|
||||
elif mtype == 'group_message':
|
||||
group_id = str(msg.get('group_id', ''))
|
||||
payload = msg.get('payload')
|
||||
# 转发给同群其他成员 (服务器不解析加密内容)
|
||||
self._broadcast_group(group_id,
|
||||
{'type': 'group_message', 'group_id': group_id,
|
||||
'from': username, 'payload': payload}, exclude=cid)
|
||||
|
||||
def _broadcast_group(self, group_id, msg, exclude=None):
|
||||
members = set(self.db.members(group_id))
|
||||
with self.lock:
|
||||
targets = [(cid2, c['socket'], c['lock']) for cid2, c in self.clients.items()
|
||||
if c.get('username') in members and cid2 != exclude]
|
||||
for cid2, sock, lk in targets:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
with lk:
|
||||
send_msg(sock, msg)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
def _remove(self, cid):
|
||||
with self.lock:
|
||||
entry = self.clients.pop(cid, None)
|
||||
if entry:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
entry['socket'].close()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
if entry['username']:
|
||||
print(f" 🔌 {entry['username']} 断开")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == '__main__':
|
||||
port = int(sys.argv[1]) if len(sys.argv) > 1 else SERVER_PORT
|
||||
srv = CentralServer(port=port)
|
||||
srv.start()
|
||||
print("按 Ctrl+C 停止服务器")
|
||||
try:
|
||||
while True:
|
||||
time.sleep(1)
|
||||
except KeyboardInterrupt:
|
||||
srv.stop()
|
||||
print("\n☁️ 服务器已停止")
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user