Separate the encrypted messaging application into its own repository, with documentation written specifically for it. The application code is byte-for-byte identical to the version previously shipped inside the ChaosCrypt repository. No functional changes. Contents - qtmain.py: PyQt5 client together with the complete backend (cipher core, account and history databases, peer-to-peer networking, relay client, GUI) - server.py: optional central relay server, using only the standard library so it can be deployed on a bare machine Documentation - README: architecture, component map, wire protocol, requirements, installation, running, data locations, security properties, troubleshooting - SECURITY: threat model, protected properties, cryptographic building blocks, and known limitations including metadata exposure, plaintext local storage, P2P host trust, best-effort withdrawal, and the absence of a ratchet - LICENSE: MIT - CHANGELOG: release history - .gitignore: excludes application data, session tokens, local databases and media from version control Security notice Unaudited. Intended for learning, experimentation and personal use; not for production deployment or for confidentiality obligations that carry a regulatory, contractual or safety dimension.
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ChaosCryptChat
End-to-end encrypted messaging built on the ChaosCrypt cipher.
A desktop chat application with a PyQt5 client and an optional relay server. Messages are encrypted on the client; the server only relays ciphertext and never holds group keys.
| Version | 3.0.0 |
| Default branch | chat |
| Licence | MIT |
| Python | 3.8+ |
Scope
ChaosCryptChat is an experiment in building a complete encrypted messaging application on top of a non-standard cipher. It is intended for learning, experimentation and personal use.
It has not been independently audited. It is not a replacement for Signal, Matrix or any audited secure messenger, and it should not be relied on where confidentiality carries regulatory, contractual or safety obligations.
The underlying cipher is documented separately in the ChaosCrypt repository, including its full design and threat analysis. That analysis applies here too: the construction is substantially stronger than its lack of audit suggests, but the scope is deliberately narrow.
What it does
- End-to-end encryption. The group key exists only on clients. The server relays ciphertext and cannot decrypt anything.
- Two group modes.
- End-to-end (P2P) — peers connect directly; no server involved.
- Central server — a relay handles NAT traversal when direct connections are not possible.
- Text, images, files and voice messages. All payload types are encrypted the same way; binary data is handled losslessly.
- Group management. Create, join, rename, set announcements, kick members, approve join requests.
- Per-user key authentication. Each member is issued a key used to sign their messages, so one member cannot impersonate another.
- Message integrity. Each message carries an HMAC; a modified ciphertext fails verification and is rejected.
- Message withdrawal. Sent messages can be recalled within a time window.
- Local history. Chat history is stored per account in SQLite and survives restarts.
Architecture
ChaosCryptChat/
├── qtmain.py PyQt5 client + the entire backend
└── server.py optional central relay server (standard library only)
qtmain.py is a single-file application: it contains the cryptographic core,
the account and history databases, the peer-to-peer networking layer, the
relay client, and the graphical interface. Running it directly starts the
client.
server.py is deliberately independent and uses only the Python standard
library, so it can be deployed on a bare server without installing anything.
Components in qtmain.py
| Component | Responsibility |
|---|---|
ChaosCryptCore |
The cipher: key generation, substitution, XOR layers |
SecureSession |
Per-session key handling, encryption and HMAC |
AccountDB |
Local accounts: salted password hashes |
HistoryDB |
Local message history per account and group |
ServerDB |
Local cache of relay state and issued user keys |
VoiceManager |
Audio recording and playback |
Message |
Message record and serialisation |
ChatServer |
Peer-to-peer listener (for P2P groups) |
ChatClient |
Peer-to-peer sender |
ServerConnection |
Client side of the central-relay protocol |
MessageItem / MessageList |
Message bubbles and the scrollable list |
LoginDialog / MainWindow |
Login and main window |
Components in server.py
| Component | Responsibility |
|---|---|
ServerDB |
Users, groups, membership and announcements |
CentralServer |
Accept loop, authentication, group management, relay |
Wire protocol
Messages are length-prefixed JSON frames:
uint32 big-endian length || UTF-8 JSON payload
Both ends implement the same framing, so the protocol is symmetric. The
handshake and command set are visible in the _dispatch methods of
ChatClient, ServerConnection and CentralServer.
Requirements
Client (qtmain.py)
| Package | Purpose |
|---|---|
PyQt5 |
Graphical interface |
Pillow |
Image handling |
numpy |
Fast buffer operations for audio and media |
pygame |
Audio playback |
sounddevice |
Audio recording |
pyaudio |
Alternative audio backend |
qrcode |
Group-key QR sharing |
Optional, depending on which features you use — the application degrades gracefully when they are absent.
Server (server.py)
None. The server uses only the standard library.
Installation
git clone https://git.dvscloud.net/dvs/ChaosCryptChat.git
cd ChaosCryptChat
pip install PyQt5 Pillow numpy pygame sounddevice pyAudio qrcode
On Linux you may also need the system audio and Qt libraries:
sudo apt install python3-pyqt5 portaudio19-dev libsndfile1
Running
Start a P2P chat
python qtmain.py
Create an account, then create a group in end-to-end mode. Share the group key with the people you want to talk to — they need it to decrypt messages.
Start the relay server
On a machine with a reachable address:
python server.py # listens on 0.0.0.0:8666
python server.py 9000 # or choose a port
Clients then create a group in central server mode and point it at that address. The server relays ciphertext; it never receives the group key.
Share group keys over a channel you already trust. Anyone holding the group key can read the group's messages. The application cannot verify how you transmitted it.
Where data lives
| Path | Contents |
|---|---|
data/users.db |
Local accounts (salted password hashes) |
data/chat_history.db |
Message history per account and group |
data/session.dat |
Session token, so you stay logged in |
data/server_state.db |
Cached relay state and issued user keys |
server_data/server.db |
Server-side users, groups, membership |
~/Documents/ChaosChat/media/ |
Received and sent media |
~/Downloads/ChaosChat/ |
Downloaded files |
The media cache can be cleared from the application's interface; clearing it deletes the stored media permanently.
These files are not encrypted at rest. The databases and the media cache hold plaintext. Protect the machine, or store the directories on an encrypted volume.
Security properties
What the design does provide:
- The server cannot read messages. Group keys never leave clients. An attacker who fully controls the relay obtains membership metadata and traffic patterns, but not message contents.
- Account passwords are not stored in plaintext. They are hashed with a random per-account salt.
- Message tampering is detected. Every message carries an HMAC over its contents; verification failures are rejected rather than displayed.
- Impersonation between members is prevented. Each member's messages are signed with a key issued to that member.
What to be aware of:
- No independent audit. The cipher, the protocol and this application have not been reviewed by a third party.
- Metadata is exposed to the relay. Who is in a group, who talks to whom, and when — none of that is hidden.
- Keys are shared out of band. If the group key is intercepted during sharing, the group is compromised.
- In P2P mode, the host is also a participant. If the host's machine is compromised, that group is compromised.
- Local data is not encrypted. See the table above.
- Withdrawal is best-effort. A recall marks a message as withdrawn and notifies the server; members who are offline may still see the original.
- Media handling depends on third-party libraries. Audio and image
processing rely on
pygame,sounddeviceandPillow, whose own security is outside this project's scope.
For the cipher's own analysis — key space, resistance to differential, linear
and algebraic cryptanalysis, and behaviour under quantum algorithms — see the
SECURITY.md in the ChaosCrypt
repository.
Troubleshooting
| Symptom | Likely cause |
|---|---|
ModuleNotFoundError: PyQt5 |
Client dependencies not installed |
| No audio devices listed | sounddevice or PortAudio missing |
| Peers cannot connect in P2P mode | Firewall blocking the port, or NAT; use the relay |
| Cannot join a group | The group key does not match, or the host has not approved you |
| Messages appear as failures | HMAC verification failed — wrong key or altered data |
| Relay unreachable | server.py not running, or the port is blocked |
Repository layout
.
├── README.md this file
├── SECURITY.md security model and known limitations
├── LICENSE MIT
├── CHANGELOG.md release history
├── .gitignore
├── qtmain.py client and backend
└── server.py relay server
Licence
MIT. Provided as-is, without warranty of any kind.
The authors accept no liability for any loss, disclosure or damage arising from use of this software.